U.K. asks to backdoor iCloud Backup encryption

['Matthew Green', "I'M A Cryptographer", "Professor At Johns Hopkins University. I'Ve Designed", 'Analyzed Cryptographic Systems Used In Wireless Networks', 'Payment Systems', 'Digital Content Protection Platforms. In My Research I Look At The Various Ways Cryptography Can Be Used To Promote User Privacy.'] A Few Thoughts on Cryptographic Engineering 2025-02-12 00:00:00

Last week the Washington Post published a bombshell story announcing that the U.K. had filed “technical capability notices” demanding that Apple modify the encryption used in their Advanced Data Protection (ADP) system for iCloud. In this case, presumably, that would involve weakening the end-to-end encryption system built into iCloud/ADP so that the U.K. could request downloads of encrypted user backups even without access to the user’s passcode or device. To comply with U.K. law, they must swear that a product is safe and works one way — and this lying must be directed to both civilian users and U.S. government users, commercial users, and so on — while Apple is forced to actively re-design their products to work differently.