The July World Economic Outlook Update barely moves the Fund’s Africa forecasts, and its baseline has already been overtaken: the Strait of Hormuz was assumed to begin reopening in mid-July, and by 13 July fighting had resumed instead. Beneath the flat average the Fund sorts the continent into the cushioned, the upgraded and the squeezed, while sub-Saharan Africa keeps outgrowing the world with both crosscurrents against it. Photo by Eva Blue on Unsplash The least informative numbers in the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) July update are the ones Africa-watchers will quote most. Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to grow by 4.3 per cent in 2026, a revision from April of exactly zero, and by 4.5 per cent in 2027, a revision of plus 0.1 points. On that evidence, nothing happened. The rest of the World Economic Outlook Update, published on 8 July as “Global Economy in Crosscurrents of War and Technology”, describes a world pulled in two directions: a Middle East war that has closed the Strait of Hormuz and left energy prices roughly 25 per cent above prewar levels, and an AI investment boom lifting the economies wired into the technology supply chain. Africa sits on the wrong side of both. The Fund’s own text concedes what its table conceals: the regional figure “masks substantial divergence across countries, reflecting differences in policy space, reform implementation, and exposure to external shocks”. Even so, the region clears the world’s bar comfortably. With global growth projected at 3.0 per cent in 2026 and 3.4 per cent in 2027, sub-Saharan Africa outgrows the world by 1.3 points this year and 1.1 next. “The world economy has weathered the shock from the war better than feared so far, with limited evidence of second round effects,” Petya Koeva Brooks, deputy director of the IMF’s research department, told the launch press conference. Africa is weathering it without the offset. A Boom That Passes the Continent By The Update’s arithmetic of winners is blunt. The four largest net exporters of AI-related hardware (Taiwan Province of China, Korea, Thailand and Malaysia) beat the Fund’s first-quarter growth projections by an average of 4.4 percentage points; the rest of the world undershot by 0.3 points. Korea alone grew at an annualised 7.5 per cent against the 1.8 per cent projected in April. That boom is what rescues the global 2027 number. None of its named beneficiaries is African. The war’s channels, by contrast, run straight through African import bills. On market pricing as of 10 June, the Fund assumes oil averaging $89 a barrel in 2026 and projects fertiliser prices rising 26 per cent and food prices 8 per cent this year. For oil-importing, non-resource-intensive economies, those three lines largely are the forecast. The Update’s most consequential sentence for the continent concerns even its bigger economies, which “are largely absent from the AI-driven global technology upswing and face headwinds from the decline in official development assistance”. Cushioned, Upgraded, Squeezed The near-flat average is the sum of three different fates. The cushioned. Nigeria holds at 4.1 per cent for 2026 and 4.3 per cent for 2027, unchanged from April, supported in the Fund’s words by “improved macroeconomic stability and favorable terms-of-trade effects”. The same paragraph expects costlier essentials to “further aggravate poverty and food insecurity”; a terms-of-trade cushion is not a welfare policy. Angola’s cushion is thinner still. The Fund’s Article IV consultation, concluded in May, called higher oil prices “a temporary offset” to a structural revenue decline, with production down nearly 40 per cent to about 1.05 million barrels a day in 2025. Price is doing the work that barrels no longer can. The upgraded. Egypt earned the continent’s largest revision, upgraded 0.4 points to 4.6 per cent growth for the 2026/27 fiscal year. The award came while the Fund expects the wider Middle East and North Africa region to contract by 0.5 per cent in 2026. The reasoning is policy: regional business press points to reform delivery and firmer macroeconomic stability under its Extended Fund Facility programme. South Africa’s move is smaller, up 0.1 points to 1.1 per cent for 2026, credited to “strengthened policy frameworks and ongoing structural reforms”. Just three African economies are named in the Update’s tables; the two upgrades among them were earned in finance ministries, not commodity markets. The squeezed. Strip out Nigeria and South Africa and the rest of the region slows from 5.6 per cent in 2025 to 5.2 per cent in both 2026 and 2027, on the Update’s figures. Inside that average sit the economies holding none of the cards: importers of fuel and fertiliser, borrowers exposed to any repricing of sovereign risk, and states that depend on shrinking aid. Abebe Selassie, director of the IMF’s African department, put the regional forecast some 0.3 points below its pre-war path in April, and observed that the aid decline lands hardest on fragile, low-income countries where assistance finances budgets, healthcare and food programmes. The sorting is a reading of external accounts, not geography: it holds wherever fuel, fertiliser and foreign assistance dominate the balance of payments, and it breaks where policy credibility outweighs commodity exposure. The Shock Absorber Is Being Removed What separates this war shock from earlier ones is what no longer arrives afterwards. The Fund’s April Regional Economic Outlook, “Hard-Won Gains Under Pressure”, gave the subject its own chapter, “Aid Cuts in Sub-Saharan Africa: This Time Is Different”, estimating that bilateral aid was cut by 16 to 28 per cent in 2025 and judging the contraction “larger, more synchronized across countries, and predominantly donor driven” than past episodes. Earlier aid cycles turned: donors retrenched, then returned. This one, on the Fund’s reading, is structural. The July Update lists the consequence among its risks: shrinking official development assistance complicates fiscal adjustment in low-income countries just as an Ebola public health emergency and an extraordinarily strong El Niño loom. Lord Waverley argued in these pages last September that Africa’s new optimism rests on partnership rather than paternalism, and warned that Western aid withdrawal would leave vacuums for others to fill. The Fund has now put numbers on the withdrawal. What to Be Sceptical About The flat 4.3 rests on an assumption that failed within days of publication. The Update’s baseline had the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz beginning in mid-July, with conditions broadly back to prewar norms by March 2027. Instead the mid-June truce between Washington and Tehran unravelled: strikes had resumed by 13 July, when Iran’s military said it had struck two tankers in the strait, and US Central Command reimposed the naval blockade of Iranian ports the next day. By late July the fighting had widened further, with US-Iran talks over control of the strait deadlocked and the waterway still shut. Bloomberg tanker tracking put crude flows through the strait at about 5.5 million barrels a day in the seven days to 15 July, down from roughly 9.4 million the week before. The downside the Fund sketched, inventories near multiyear lows and every import-price channel widening, is now materialising. It sharpens rather than overturns the sorting above: each contested week widens the gap between the cushioned, the upgraded and the squeezed. The technology side has its own warning label: the Update flags “frothy equity valuations” in AI-exposed markets, and a correction would shrink the very world numbe...